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Both critical and functional theories 
of the legal profession suggest that 
controlling entry is a defining feature of 
professionalism. Indeed, Abel has 
suggested ('The Decline of 
Professionalism?' (1986) 49 Modern Law 
Review, p. 1) that the solicitors' profession 
has formally ceded such control to the 
universities and thus relinquished its 
claim to being a true profession. This 
article describes the economic and 
structural barriers which control entry 
into the profession. It will be argued that 
the profession still demonstrably controls 
entry and does so in a way that 
discriminates on the basis of ethnicity, 
class and gender. Several factors 
permeate vocational education and 
training contracts encouraging several 
cycles of gentrification of the student
SELF DISCRIMINATION
Student decisions to exclude themselves 
are contingent on their own assessments 
of financial risk and reward. Students 
with parents or relatives in the 
profession, or from a particular class 
background are more likely to choose 
law as a career.
cohort. This process of super- 
gentrification has exacerbated a 
narrowing of the professional base and 
needs to be addressed if an unequal 
profession is to regain some balance.
THE POWER OF DEBT
Although they generally come from a
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socially and educationally advantaged 
background, their backgrounds do not 
appear to differ from students generally 
(see Shiner, Michael and Tim Newburn: 
Entry into the Legal Professions: the Law 
Student Cohon Study, Year 3 (Law Society, 
1995), pp. 16-28.)
The next source of recruits, often the 
ones particularly favoured by law firms, 
are non-law graduates who convert via 
the Common Professional Lxam (CPE). 
CPL students are more likely to be white, 
male, from independent or grammar 
schools and to have parents who have 
degrees (Shiner and Newburn, op. cit. p. 
23). One reason for this is economic. 
Students taking the course have to fund a 
further year of study and find fees of 
about £3,000. Clearly, students with 
wealthy parents are more able to take up 
such places. The cost of the course also 
gives the profession a position of 
influence, particularly in the virtual 
absence of local authority funding. CPL 
students will look to future employers for 
funding of their studies or, at the very 
least, a guarantee of employment when 
their studies are completed. Recruitment 
decisions by such employers will crucially 
determine the make-up of those 
proceeding to the CPL.
The next stage of training is the Legal 
Practice Course. From an estimated 
12,000 law and CPE graduates, about 
8,000 places are offered. The costs of this 
course are significant: around £5,000 
plus a year's maintenance costs if full- 
time. This is a major reason for students 
deciding not to apply for, or take up 
offers of, an LPC place. Again, the
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securing of a training contract (of which 
there have been about 4,200 per year in 
recent years) will affect this decision, 
because of direct funding by law firms or 
the promise of a salary and qualification 
as a solicitor, if they manage to pass the 
exams. Again, parental funding is also a 
crucial source of income for LPC 
students.
between groups of students. A survey 
looking at students and trainee solicitors 
estimated that more than one in eight 
had debts in excess of £10,000, with 
some having debts of £16,000 (Richard L 
Moorhead: Protecting whom? The Impact of 
the Minimum Salary — a survey into salary and 
debt levels of trainees and LPC students 
(unpublished, 1997)). The average 
student debt was about £4,500. 
Conversely, one in four students and 
trainees had no debts at all. Such students 
are more likely to come from more 
privileged backgrounds (Shiner and 
Newburn, op. cit. p. 74).
THE RISK FACTOR
Recent years have seen the 
recruitment market for trainees, in terms 
of the number of training contracts, 
remain fairly steady. Set against this, the 
marked increase in the number of 
available vocational places coupled with 
initially high levels of demand from 
students created a recruitment crisis by 
ensuring a significant mismatch between 
the number of LPC graduates and the 
number of training contracts.
Far from widening access to the 
profession, the increased number of 
vocational places increased the risks to 
LPC students because more of them were 
competing for the same number of jobs. 
This in turn appears to have encouraged 
students to exclude themselves from the 
profession: demand for CPE and LPC 
places has reduced markedly (by about 
10% a year) for the past three years. 
Student decisions to exclude themselves 
are contingent on their own assessments 
of financial risk and reward. Cultural 
factors are also at work. Certain types of 
student (i.e. those with parents or 
relatives in the profession, or from a 
particular class background) are more 
likely to choose law as a career. There are 
also indications that students deselect 
themselves from the profession on the 
basis that they are unlikely to get on 
because of their social class (Shiner and 
Newburn, op. cit. p. 41).
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The main source of professional 
recruits is undergraduate law students.
Figures for debt illustrate the 
problem and the marked differences
Debt, the costs of the LPC, and the 
oversupply of LPC places have
exacerbated the economic risks for 
would-be LPC students and further 
narrowed the base of students willing to 
take on the risk. Employers and more
THE OLD STORY
Oxbridge graduates were favoured. 
Women, in spite of the equality of 
numbers entering the profession, still 
found it harder than men to get training 
contracts. However the strongest 
barriers were for applicants from ethnic 
minorities and those from less privileged 
backgrounds.
wealthy parents are crucial determinants 
of the composition of the future 
profession, as are student images of the 
profession and their expectation of 
success within it. Any comfort that might 
be taken from the market apparently 
righting itself and allowing a stronger 
match between the number of training 
contracts and the number of LPC places 
must be strongly tempered by the 
attrition of students from less wealthy 
backgrounds which has enabled this.
THE TRAINING CONTRACT
The most crucial factor in a student's 
entry into the profession is their ability to 
secure a training contract. Either through
o o
direct funding of fees and maintenance, 
or through the firm offer of a two-year 
job and the prize of qualification as a 
solicitor, the 'economic risks of 
embarking on the LPC are mitigated and 
there is some level of predictable benefit. 
Decisions to recruit trainee solicitors are 
thus of double significance: they 
determine those who can actually 
become solicitors by securing a trainingJ o o
contract and, for those who have not 
secured a training contract prior to taking 
the course, the risks and preferences of 
the recruitment market determine who 
is willing to try and gain entry.
Evidence in relation to problems 
with actual recruitment by the profession 
is damning (Shiner and Newburn, op. cit. 
p. 92). Even when controlling for 
academic performance, family 
connections with the profession and 
work experience (the latter two factors in 
particular being potentially 
discriminatory in any event), graduates 
from new universities were 
disadvantaged. Oxbridge graduates were 
favoured. Women, in spite of the equality 
of numbers entering the profession, still 
found it harder than men to get training
contracts. However the strongest barriers
o
were for applicants from ethnic 
minorities and those from less privileged 
backgrounds.
A further finesse on the profession's 
control of entry is its treatment of trainee 
salaries. Evidence suggests that 
differences in trainee salary may be 
affected by gender and ethnic group 
(Moorhead, op. cit. and Nick Armstrong 
and Richard Moorhead: 'Bare Minimum' 
[1997] New Law Journal, pp. 487, 501). 
Women and ethnic minority trainees 
appear to be more likely to be on lower 
salaries and more likely to be on or below 
the Law Society's minimum salary. Thus 
even those that secure entry do so on 
lower wages and with the expectation 
that salary differences and promotion 
problems will increase as they progress 
(see, for example, Judith Sidaway, 'Salary 
Lottery' (1997) 94/27 Gazette, pp. 16- 
17; and Eleni Skordaki: 'Glass slippers 
and glass ceilings: women in the legal 
profession' (1996) 3 International Journal 
oj the Legal Profession, p. 7). The risks for 
such students are higher and the rewards 
lower.
The professions, choosing from a 
pool of students which is already 
gentrified by cost, risk and debto J
problems, further filters candidates by 
selecting for the profession students who 
bear the characteristics most like the 
profession of the past: the effect is one of 
'super gentrification'. The process occurs 
throughout the pre-training contract
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stages of education and is itself 
strengthened by students' perceptions 
and experiences of the profession and its 
recruitment decisions. Signals that the 
profession sends out about itself, as well 
as its actual recruitment decisions, have 
an effect at all stages of the process. 
Control of entry is thus formal 
(solicitors' firms individually decide who 
gets training contracts) and informal 
(those decisions influence the choices of 
students considering the vocational stages 
of training).
SOME CONCLUSIONS
The structure of the training market, 
an over-supply of costly training courses, 
mainly studied full-time, and funded by 
trainees' own commercial debt, parental 
support and financial assistance from 
some firms has contributed to a 
narrowing in the nature and social 
background of the student cohort. The
professions' recruitment decisions 
impact critically on student decisions as 
to the risks and rewards offered by the 
legal profession. The combined effect is a 
market structured very effectively to 
narrow the social background of its new 
entrants.
The blame for some of these 
problems can be placed most clearly at 
the feet of the profession. Recruitment 
practices are a major factor. It remains to 
be seen whether the Law Society's 
requirements for codes of practice and 
voluntary monitoring of targets for equal 
opportunities will have any effect.
Other opportunities may be found 
for reducing the structural problems. 
One option is to abandon the training 
contract as a pre-cursor to qualification, 
possibly with a lengthened LPC course. 
Successful graduates at least get the 
qualification of 'solicitor' and can seek 
work as such. This might make matters 
worse by increasing the costs of the 
course itself and shifting the problem
SUPER GENTRY
The professions, choosing from a pool 
of students which is already gentrified
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by cost, risk and debt problems, further 
filters candidates by selecting for the 
profession students who bear the 
characteristics most like the profession 
of the past.
from recruitment of trainees to 
recruitment of assistant solicitors. It is a 
solution which suggests a market cure 
when in fact the market appears to 
constitute a central problem.
Reducing the costs of the LPC course 
by reducing to a minimum the core of the 
course would be another possibility. 
Similarly, encouraging, or even requiring, 
the modularisation of the LPC and the 
integration of the modules alongside the 
training contract might allow students to 
spread the economic burden of the 
course over a longer period of time and 
whilst working. Risk for students would 
be reduced, but reasons of finance and 
convenience would mean firms and 
course providers would need 
considerable persuasion. @
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